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AMBIDEXTERITY AS HISTORICALLY EMBEDDED PROCESS: EVIDENCE FROM 
NASA, 1958-2016  
 
Abstract 
Even though the growing ambidexterity literature has delivered useful insights, this theme 
has been researched largely in static and a-contextual terms, without adequate attention to how an 
organization’s history and context can shape its present. In this paper we employ NASA as an in-
depth case study to trace how its historical trajectory has shaped its current propensity to be 
ambidextrous. Our study reveals organizational ambidexterity as a path-dependent, contingent 
process rather than something necessarily achievable via the more generic prescriptions of 
structural, temporal or contextual ambidexterity models.   
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AMBIDEXTERITY AS HISTORICALLY EMBEDDED PROCESS: EVIDENCE FROM 
NASA, 1958-2016  
 
Introduction 
The need to deal with contradictory and even paradoxical tensions is endemic to the fabric 
of organizations (Lewis, 2000; Papachroni, Heracleous & Paroutis, 2015). For instance, 
organizations have to functionally differentiate, but also integrate their design and processes; they 
have to institute control, but also empower and energize people; and they have to exploit current 
resources and capabilities, but also explore and develop new ones for the future (Abell, 1999; 
Cameron, 1986; March, 1991).  
Ambidexterity research has grown substantially over the last two and half decades 
(O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013). Prescriptions for accomplishing ambidexterity include structural 
separation of exploratory from exploitative units (O’Reilly & Tushman, 1996; Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 2004), temporal separation in terms of a punctuated equilibrium between longer periods 
of exploitation and shorter periods of exploration (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Siggelkow & 
Levinthal, 2003), and building a supportive but stretching context that allows employees to 
decide for themselves whether to focus on exploitation or exploration activities depending on the 
situation (Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004).  
Despite the expanding literature however, scholars have noted that ambidexterity has been 
researched largely in static and a-contextual terms (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Simsek et al., 
2009), without adequate attention to how an organization’s history and context can shape its 
present, and in particular its ongoing propensity to accomplish organizational ambidexterity. The 
scant focus on time accords with broader organizational scholarship, that has moved away from 
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historical studies in the 1950s in an effort to emulate natural science methodologies, only to 
rekindle its interest in a historical perspective in more recent years (Kipping & Usdiken, 2014).  
This lacuna is unfortunate since organizational ambidexterity, as the ability to both 
exploit and explore, involves a dynamic aspect of the need to deal with context-bound, messy 
organizational issues, over substantial time periods (Raisch et al., 2009). The contextual richness 
and particular organizational nuances that develop over time and that can inform our 
understanding of why some organizations accomplish ambidexterity while others struggle to do 
so can best be picked up via historical - contextual approaches. As O’Reilly and Tushman (2013: 
330) highlight, “it may be that time is a crucial contingent variable.” In our study, we explore 
how an organization’s historical trajectory can shape the present, and in particular its ability to 
accomplish ambidexterity.     
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Organizational Ambidexterity Research  
Organizational ambidexterity as a term was first employed by Duncan (1976), who 
proposed the creation of dual structures to facilitate different phases of the innovation process; 
explorative structures for the initiation stage and exploitative ones for the latter implementation 
stage. It was not until March’s (1991) seminal paper however that the notion of ambidexterity 
achieved traction in the management literature. March (1991) identified exploration with 
activities of “search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, 
innovation”; and exploitation with “refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, 
implementation, execution” (March, 1991: 71). March noted that even though these two types of 
activities are in tension as they compete for scarce resources and involve different types of 
activities, both should nevertheless be pursued. The attempt to do both however runs the risk of 
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the “failure trap”, a focus on exploration at the expense of exploitation; and the “success trap”, a 
focus on exploitation at the expense of exploration (Levinthal & March, 1993). These authors 
advocated organizational learning and adaptation as a means of overcoming the inertia 
occasioned by path dependency.  
As a way of accomplishing ambidexterity, O’Reilly and Tushman (1996) and Tushman 
and O’Reilly (2004) recommend structural separation, the creation of separate units to pursue 
exploration, as other units focus on exploitation, all within the corporate umbrella; where 
coordination of the two types of units is carried out by the top management team. A second 
prescription for achieving ambidexterity is temporal separation, where business units focus on 
either exploitation or exploration at different time periods; typically through long spells of 
exploitation punctuated by shorter periods of exploration (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; 
Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). Finally, Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) and Birkinshaw and 
Gibson (2004) identify contextual ambidexterity, where organizations develop a supportive but 
stretching context that encourages the pursuit of both exploitative and exploratory activities by 
actors depending on the contingencies they face in their task environment.  
Related research has expanded the agenda beyond the organizational level (Stadler, 
Rajwani & Karaba, 2014) and proposed that inter-organizational relationships (Im & Rai, 2008; 
Kauppila, 2010), network structures (Riccaboni and Moliterni, 2009) and differentiated intra-
company ties in the context of strategic alliances (Tiwana, 2008) can be ways of gaining 
particular competencies that can help balance exploration and exploitation (Turner, Swart & 
Maylor, 2013).  
Empirical studies of ambidexterity largely focus on environmental, organizational, and 
senior management team antecedents, as well as the tradeoffs involved such as short vs long term 
or stability vs adaptability (Lavie, Stettner & Tushman, 2010), with the research finding broadly 
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positive relationships between particular dimensions of ambidexterity and organizational 
performance (Junni et al., 2013).  
The Paucity of Time and Context 
The shaping role of history is recognized in the ambidexterity literature. As Lavie et al. 
(2010: 121) note, the differences across organizations’ tendencies to exploit or explore are related 
to particular organizational features such as structure and culture, that are in turn rooted in the 
organization’s particular history. Yet, empirical studies have not adequately examined how 
history can shape an organization’s propensity to be ambidextrous. Existing research potentially 
neglects important historical and contextual elements relating to both internal and external 
interdependencies that can facilitate or impede ambidexterity. As Raisch et al. (2009) note, the 
dynamic dimension of organizational ambidexterity is not well understood. Simsek et al. (2009: 
888) further observe that “extant research on ambidexterity has been mostly cross-sectional while 
longitudinal studies are needed to observe the processes underlying ambidexterity types within an 
organization”. Finally, Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008: 402) call for longitudinal, process-oriented 
research that entails “a methodological shift … to overcome the present research’s static 
character”.  
A historical, contextual perspective offers a useful means of understanding an 
organization’s present, and in particular its ongoing propensity to accomplish ambidexterity. We 
examine how organizational and environmental features can foster as well as frustrate efforts 
towards ambidexterity over time. Dominant prescriptions for accomplishing ambidexterity 
(structural, temporal or contextual ambidexterity) are useful as broad approaches, but cannot 
offer detailed understanding of why an organization has or has not managed to accomplish 
ambidexterity. Further, they cannot be implemented in a vacuum since historical and institutional 
factors shape the feasibility of such broad-level prescriptions.   
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METHODOLOGY 
Our research question therefore is: how do an organization’s history and context shape its 
ongoing propensity to be ambidextrous? In order to address this question, we conducted a 
longitudinal, holistic case study of NASA (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2008). NASA has had to deal 
with ambidexterity pressures as its institutional environment shifted, available resources declined, 
and a “business ideology” became more important to its continued legitimacy (Vaughan, 1996: 
210).  We employ NASA as an in-depth, longitudinal case study to trace how its historical 
development, its context, and key events have shaped its ongoing propensity to be ambidextrous. 
We draw from a variety of data sources which include committee reports, official statistics, 
organizational performance reviews, published research in space-related outlets that focuses on 
NASA, and books about NASA’s history and particular programs. As such, we continue the 
tradition of conducting exploratory case studies as the main methodology of historical research; 
but in our case also accompanied by the aim of developing more generalizable theoretical 
insights, as recommended by de Jong, Higgins and van Driel (2015).  
Our narrative extends from 1958 when NASA was founded as a legal entity, until the 
present. Kipping and Usdiken (2014) distinguish between two interrelated approaches of 
engaging with organizational history; “history to theory”, where historical evidence is employed 
to inform theory-building, and “history as theory”, where history enters theory as an influencing 
and explanatory variable in its own right. “Historical cognizance” refers to studies that take 
history seriously and employ elements from both these approaches. In this study we investigate 
how NASA’s historical trajectory shapes its present, particularly its propensity to accomplish 
ambidexterity, and derive certain theoretical insights, a “history to theory” approach. However 
we also derive historical processes such as imprinting (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013) and path 
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dependence (Sydow, Schreyogg & Koch, 2009) as explanatory factors, a “history in theory” 
approach.  
We selected NASA as our research case via theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007) since the organization presents a unique setting with respect to the pressures it faces for 
balancing exploration and exploitation; and its efforts over time to do so, that have been shaped 
by its history (Bruggeman, 2002). NASA’s mission is space exploration, which requires 
outstanding organizational capabilities in terms of innovation of technologies and processes, 
often to address technical challenges that have not been met before (such as the effects of space 
on various aspects of human physiology over time and how to control these). NASA also strives 
to execute missions safely, with high reliability and minimal error, as a high reliability 
organization (Boin & Schulman, 2008). Consistent with broader trends on new public 
management (Reay & Hinings, 2009), over time government agencies have been required to do 
more with less, raising the efficiency demands on NASA. The emergence of external competition 
from private space companies and other states with space capabilities mean that NASA is not the 
only game in town any more. To deal with the simultaneous, twin demands of exploration and 
exploitation (March, 1991), NASA has been working towards becoming more ambidextrous 
(Core Magazine, 2016; Gonzalez, 2010) through initiatives such as open innovation (Lakhani, 
Lifshitz-Assaf & Tushman, 2013) and expanded partnerships with the commercial sector 
accompanied by related organizational changes to facilitate these collaborations (Ochoa, 2012).   
The unit of analysis is NASA within its context (Yin, 2008). The longitudinal aspect of 
the data allowed us to gain a deeper understanding of how contextual dimensions can facilitate or 
create barriers to organizational ambidexterity over time. We conducted our analysis using the 
procedures of grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), which have enabled us to identify 
initial narrative themes in the data, which then cohered into second order themes, which 
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themselves clustered into aggregate categories. In this process, we drew from a variety of data 
sources, engaging in data triangulation (Jick, 1979) in order to enhance the internal validity 
(Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki, 2008) of the analysis. We engaged in pattern-matching of data from 
various sources, as well as between data and theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). Figure 1 below portrays the themes that arose from the analysis; and Table 1 provides 
representative fragments of data that comprise these themes.  
   ----------------------------------------------------------- 
     Figure 1 about here 
   ----------------------------------------------------------- 
   ----------------------------------------------------------- 
     Table 1 about here 
   ----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
NASA’S HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY AND THE PURSUIT OF AMBIDEXTERITY 
NASA’s Creation Through a Federation of Pre-Existing Research Labs 
NASA was instituted by the US Congress as a legal entity in 1958 with the mandate of 
accomplishing “the preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and 
space science and technology” (National Aeronautics Space Act, 1958, Sec102, c5). NASA was 
initially primarily constituted by pre-existing laboratory operations of the research centers of the 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), which has been created in 1915 to help 
expedite the development of US aeronautical technology after the onset of the First World War 
(NASA History Program Office). On 1st October 1958, five NACA facilities officially constituted 
NASA: the Lewis Research Center (Ohio), the Langley Research Center and Wallops rocket test 
range (Virginia), and the Ames Research Center and Muroc aircraft test range (California). At its 
founding NASA had 8,240 staff, 8,000 of which came from NACA, and an annual budget of US$ 
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100m (Portee, 1998). NACA’s culture emphasized a can-do, problem-solving attitude, applied 
experimentation in well-run laboratories with a focus on aeronautics, and work with contractors 
as needed, to supply required infrastructure such as parts of large wind tunnels or other 
simulators (Bugos & Boyd, 2008).  
In July 1960 the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Alabama, which included German 
rocket scientists who moved to the US after the Second World War, formally became a part of 
NASA and was renamed the George C Marshall Space Flight Center. In May 1961 President 
Kennedy announced the objective of “landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to 
earth” before the decade was out. Later that year, in September, newly appointed NASA 
Administrator James Webb announced that the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston (renamed 
as the Lyndon B Johnson Space Center in 1973), which grew out of the Space Task Group of the 
Langley Research Center, would be the NASA center responsible for human space flight. The 
John F. Kennedy Space Center was then founded in 1962 in Florida, as a primary launch facility, 
managed by German Engineers from the Marshall Space Flight Center.  
Each center developed a particular culture through its history. Employees of Langley 
laboratory for example took pride in Langley’s intellectual prowess in terms of technology. The 
Ames laboratory was a spin-off of the Langley laboratory and displayed a strong engineering 
hands-on approach. The rocket scientists at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency embodied a highly 
technocratic culture with particular emphasis on detail, proceeding incrementally and being in 
control of all stages of a project from technical research and planning to actual fabrication of 
equipment. In contrast to the in-house culture at Langley Center and the ABMA (later Marshall 
Center), the Manned Spacecraft Center (later Johnson Space Center) relied to a larger extent on 
contractors’ assistance for a significant part of its activities (McCurdy, 1993, 2010). Each center 
was dedicated to exploration in its own domain, within a largely decentralized corporate design. 
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Reliance on technical competencies that were found within the organization was a founding 
principle. The centers had a robust sense of autonomy, engendering a “not invented here” attitude 
and a sense of technical superiority that was part of the political narrative at the time. At the time, 
accomplishing technological breakthroughs that would aid space exploration and achieving the 
geopolitical goals of the US was instrumental, downplaying the need to do so efficiently. In this 
sense the ambidexterity pendulum was swung in the direction of exploration and away from 
exploitation.  
Spatial Separation and Ambidexterity at the Founding of NASA. According to Levine 
(1992: 199), “From its very inception, NASA was not a unified whole … Glennan, the first 
NASA administrator, saw as one of his main tasks the integration of these diverse units into one 
organization. But that integration never took place”, leading to overlap of responsibilities and 
poor coordination. Structural and spatial separation has been suggested as an organizational way 
to accomplish ambidexterity, where explorative units are separated from exploitative units, and 
coordination takes place by senior leadership (O’Reilly & Tushman, 1996; Tushman & O’Reilly, 
2004). The objective is to enable exploration to take place unencumbered by established 
corporate constraints, and for the results of exploration to be subsequently efficiently exploited 
by related subunits. Despite the challenges of low cross-center integration, spatial separation at 
NASA was an early form of ambidexterity.  
NASA had to still fulfill the core function of aeronautics research that was its NACA 
legacy while embarking on the human exploration of space.  Langley, Ames and Lewis were 
Centers dedicated to ongoing aeronautics research, providing services and knowledge to the 
aeronautics industry; while the newer centers were focused on exploration of space. The Centers’ 
different histories, cultures, spatial separation across the country, decentralization and high 
degrees of autonomy facilitated the agency’s ability to simultaneously exploit the existing 
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resources and infrastructure to support the growing aeronautics industry while taking the risks 
required to achieve the goal of landing a man on the moon by the end of the decade. The loose 
coupling across the Centers enabled organizational adaptability as the demands of the 
environment and mission imperatives changed. NASA maintained its spatial separation for future 
exploration missions when it added the Goddard Research Center and Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 
This organizational differentiation served NASA well during its creation. However, separation 
would become a challenge as the agency shifted priorities and resources more towards 
exploration projects and less on exploitative projects; loose coupling involved some duplication 
of resources and research efforts, which challenged efficiency.  
Shared Norms and Super-Ordinate Goal Lead to Outperformance in the 1960s 
Despite the spatial separation and differences in culture across the Centers, there were 
from the early years several common norms which derived from their laboratory, applied 
research-oriented history, as well as the professional cultures of scientists and engineers: “a 
commitment to research, testing and verification; to in-house technical capability; to hands-on 
activity; to the acceptance of risk and failure; to open communications; to a belief that NASA 
was staffed with exceptional people; to attention to detail; and to a ‘frontiers of flight’ mentality” 
(McCurdy, 1989: 302).  
The precipitating event triggering higher degrees of cooperation among the dispersed 
units was the shared desire “to go to the moon, plus the competition and the deadline that was 
imposed by the knowledge that the Russians were trying to do the same … When project Apollo 
came along in 1961, it transformed the requirements that were placed on these research 
laboratories” (McCurdy, 2013). President Kennedy’s September 1962 speech instilling to the 
nation the vision of going to the moon and returning safely before the decade was out, was a 
super-ordinate goal that precipitated a period of intense focus and collaboration at NASA, what 
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Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) refer to as a revolutionary change. The shared vision of going to 
the moon and returning safely was a strong integrative force (Jansen et al., 2008) that highlighted 
common norms and helped to integrate the de-centralized and autonomous units.  
In the early years NASA was able to develop and maintain its technical capability by 
practicing and prioritizing in-house technical work and a hands-on work environment for its 
engineers which had originated with NACA and AMBA. Hands-on work helped to maintain in-
house technical capabilities, a pride in NASA’s own competencies, the ability to keep engineers 
up to date and the potential to attract exceptional employees (McCurdy, 2010). The emphasis on 
extensively testing hardware before sending it into space was an important operating principle of 
each of the centers, a shared value that became stronger when human space flight begun. This 
also shaped the relationship with contractors in terms of “contractor penetration” by NASA 
personnel to ensure that these norms were adopted (McCurdy, 1993: 117). 
In terms of Sheremata’s (2000) insights about the need to balance centrifugal and 
centripedal forces, NASA’s culture from its founding was primarily centrifugal, without a robust 
institutionalized element of centripetal forces to counterbalance the centrifugal element. The 
super-ordinate goal of putting a man on the moon combined with the cold war competitive 
context, acted as robust centripetal forces during the 1960s, facilitating NASA’s first human 
moon landing in 1969. Following the Apollo program, the agency instituted centripetal forces 
through creation of program offices that integrated information from various centers to support 
collective action in pursuit of the program goals. Program offices acted as centripetal forces to 
balance the centrifugal tendencies of the centers. However, the effects of centrefugal forces have 
persisted. According to the Space Foundation (2012: 17) report, “while the centers can and do 
cooperate on specific matters, anything that challenges a center’s autonomy, independence, or 
turf is met with immediate and stubborn resistance”.  
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Creeping Regulation and Inertia Revector Both Exploration and Exploitation 
After its founding in 1958 and during the Apollo era (1961-1972), NASA enjoyed a great 
degree of autonomy in setting its own processes, for example in terms of recruitment and 
remuneration. NASA enjoyed a reputation as a high-end, frontier-pushing scientific organization, 
thereby being able to attract young employees from top tier universities. The average age of 
employees in the control room during the moon landing in 1969 was 26 (Teitel, 2012). Under 
NASA’s first Administrator, Keith Glennan (who led NASA from October 1958 to January 1961) 
Congress had allowed NASA to fill over 700 positions that were not subject to federal pay scales, 
affording the organization flexibility to compete with industry for the brightest, most capable 
employees (Levine, 1982).  
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, introduced after the Watergate scandal, had the 
noble intent of creating more transparency and limiting lobbying power. Public officials had to 
disclose financial and employment history, and public agencies were hampered in their ability to 
employ people who have worked in industry due to possible conflicts of interest. The Federal 
Civil Service Agency reversed NASA’s rights to pay salaries to specialists that were not subject 
to Federal Payment Regulation thereby limiting NASA’s flexibility in comparison to industry 
(Levine, 1982).  
Employee turnover rates at NASA reduced and new hires decreased, leading to a steadily 
aging demographic within the agency. Between 1960-1968, turnover rates ranged between 10-
15%, whereas between 1969-1990 they ranged between 5-10% (McCurdy, 1993). Over the last 
two decades employee turnover rates have been on a downward trend, with the turnover of non-
retiree employees falling to 1.7% in 2013. Further, the average age of NASA employees has been 
on the rise. In 1993, 45-59 year-old employees made up 38% of NASA’s workforce; by 2013 this 
figure was 57%. In 1993, 20-34 year-old employees made 32% of NASA’s workforce. By 2013, 
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this figure decreased to 15%. NASA is not immune to the workforce challenges that face other 
industries with an experienced technical workforce that remain in the company due to emotional 
attachment to the mission. The challenge resides in the infusion of new perspectives, ideas and 
business processes that can challenge the organizational routines and shared norms that can 
become more established and inflexible over time. NASA has over time sought to restructure 
itself and initiate partnerships with the commercial sector to infuse new perspectives into the 
organization.  
Meanwhile, more structured management approaches were implemented. Given the 
administrative requirements of the Apollo program, the government ushered in large systems 
engineering principles imported from the military. These were authorized by headquarters (level 
A) and employed by program offices (level B) to coordinate projects across subunits (level C). 
Hierarchy and formalization, inspired by military roots, increased. Progressive budget restrictions 
following Apollo led NASA to expand contracting out to organizations that could perform tasks 
or develop technology more efficiently, and less hands-on work was conducted internally 
(McCurdy, 1989). This shift towards private industry also provided seed capabilities to grow the 
commercial space community. As more expertise was distributed to the contractor community it 
provided more opportunity for new aerospace companies to emerge and leverage this engineering 
input. 
Concurrently general federal regulations grew, imposing higher administrative demands 
on NASA in terms of the introduction of expanded accounting standards, occupational health and 
safety and environmental protection laws, and over 60 new procurement laws between 1965 and 
1991. US Congress staff grew 300% in the first 30 years of NASA’s existence, which increased 
the demands on government agencies in their efforts to engage with US Congress 
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1993). Tragic accidents such as the fire on board of Apollo 1 in 1967 and the Challenger disaster 
in 1986 heavily increased political oversight.  
NASA was not immune to the growth of state administrative regulations and need for 
detailed reporting led to corresponding growth in all of the government agencies and NASA’s 
own dedicated administrative resource. Up till 1956, around 2% of NASA’s employees were 
working in the agency’s headquarters. By 1990, this figure had risen to almost 9%. Further, while 
around 5% of NASA employees were professional administrators in 1961 working in all of 
NASA’s units, this figure had risen to over 18% by 1991 (McCurdy, 1993).  
Process management tools such as ISO and Six Sigma have been implemented at NASA. 
Benner & Tushman (2003) note that the standardization and efficiency orientation of such tools 
have a variation decreasing effect; they streamline processes but at the same increase inertia and 
decrease adaptability. Researchers have associated inertia with a company’s age and size, higher 
levels of which tend to foster bureaucracy (Han et al., 2001) unless there is a strong market 
orientated culture to act as an effective countervailing force. Tushman and O’Reilly (1996: 18) 
associate firms that have grown in size and age with structural and cultural inertia, the 
“organizational equivalent of high cholesterol”. The burgeoning of regulatory demands on 
NASA, and the corresponding internal increase in administrative resource, coupled with lower 
flexibility in terms of human resource decisions and a low turnover in the workforce, were factors 
that together contributed to an increase in structural and cultural inertia at NASA. These factors 
created potent challenges to ambidexterity. Concurrently, despite these factors, NASA was still 
able to accomplish exploration missions that included the Mars Pathfinder, Hubble Space 
Telescope, Space Shuttle, Shuttle-Mir Program and the International Space Station.  
FBC Approach Aims to Accomplish Ambidexterity But Has Mixed Record 
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Responding to stakeholder concerns about NASA’s high costs, Daniel Goldin, NASA 
administrator from 1992 to 2001, introduced the “faster, better, cheaper” (FBC) approach which 
aimed to continue bold exploration but at significantly lower cost (Lambright, 2007); in other 
words, aiming to simultaneously accomplish both exploration and exploitation. Historically, 
NASA processes have been influenced by the systems management approach brought in from the 
Air Force during the Apollo era. Systems management combined both decentralization, leaving 
individual centers the freedom to carry out technical hands-on activity and extensive testing, with 
centralization through the employment of highly detailed procedures by central project managers 
to track the progress of large projects with the ultimate aim of tracking performance and 
reliability (McCurdy, 2001). The focus on testing and reliability reduced the likelihood of failure, 
but at the same time downplayed cost awareness. In order to achieve maximum reliability, and 
influenced by NASA’s technocratic culture, engineers incorporated redundancy for multiple 
scenarios, tested parts relentlessly and built in various sensors and safety features, resulting in 
skyrocketing costs and stretching of schedules (McCurdy, 2001). 
Goldin’s FBC approach involved focus on smaller missions, incorporation of advanced 
technology, reduction of headquarter management and decentralization to centers, a higher 
emphasis on teamwork and co-location, and lower emphasis on detailed documentation. 
Nevertheless, FBC programs met as a whole met with a 37% failure rate, significantly above 
previous norms. There were two main reasons for these higher failure rates. First, linear increases 
in project complexity entailed exponential increases of required project costs to effectively 
address this complexity (Bearden, 2003; Sarsfield, 1998).  FBC however involved cost and 
schedule reduction at a faster rate than that which complexity could be reduced, leading to higher 
failure rates. Second, there was incongruence between the FBC way of doing things and the 
established large systems management approach. This large systems approach involved hands-on 
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extensive testing and documentation and continued significant outsourcing to contractors who 
were not entirely on board with the FBC approach. The inertia of existing processes led to 
inadequate coordination between different teams and centers involved in projects (McCurdy, 
2001). For example, for the Climate Orbiter project carried out under the FBC approach, the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory cooperated with the private corporation Lockheed Martin Astronautics. 
The project, which aimed to launch a probe to Mars, failed due to the fact that JPL used the 
metric system for their calculations whereas Lockheed Martin used English imperial 
measurements. The Climate Orbiter cost $326.6m to develop and simply disappeared behind 
Mars (NASA, 2013). It would be fair to say that the FBC approach left a mixed legacy within 
NASA (Lambright, 2007; McCurdy, 2013) and despite its best intentions it was not successful in 
accomplishing ambidexterity. 
Funding Uncertainty and Temporal Incongruence Both Impede and Foster Ambidexterity  
NASA’s budget accounted for 4.5% of the federal budget in 1969, the year of the moon 
landing, having risen steeply to that percentage from a base of around 0.1% in 1958, the year of 
NASA’s founding. The dramatic rise in funding in NASA’s initial years had a significant impact 
on NASA’s cultural attitude towards efficiency (exploitation). The goal of human spaceflight in 
the 1960s was primarily geopolitical (National Research Council, 2012). Given the Cold War 
context that triggered the space race, the belief developed within NASA that the US government 
would spend any amount needed to establish US leadership in space. Accomplishing the goals 
mattered much more than doing so efficiently (Hall, 2003; McCurdy, 2001). After the manned 
moon landings (1969-1972), many politicians were not convinced about the need to continue 
spending large amounts on spaceflight, which led to gradual reductions in NASA’s budget 
(McCurdy, 2001). By 2013 NASA’s share of the federal budget had progressively dropped to 
0.5% while the number of programs it was required to support increased.  
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In order to receive funding for large projects, project managers often indicated overly 
optimistic cost projections when applying for funding (National Research Council, 2012). Year 
after year NASA received cuts to its budget necessitating it to re-plan programs and reduce 
capabilities from the original design, that resulted in impacting the total life cycle cost. For 
example, individual launch costs of the space shuttle were estimated at $450 million but then cost 
$1.3 billion per flight (Pinchefsky, 2012). Even with these changes the shuttle vehicles flew 135 
missions and carried the components to create the International Space Station.  
Over the years, there has been some ambivalence in how stakeholders view NASA. 
According to a 1961 Gallup poll, 52% of Americans believed that NASA would reach the moon 
until the decade was over, but 58% felt that Congress was spending too much money for this 
endeavor (McCurdy, 2001). A Gallup poll in 2009 indicated that 58% of polled individuals 
agreed that NASA had created enough benefits for the US and is worth its costs, 13% believed 
that NASA was doing an excellent job, and 45% it was doing a good job (Gallup, 2009). When 
the National Research Council conducted an independent assessment of NASA’s strategic 
direction and agency management, it reported that NASA’s strategic planning process was 
influenced to a greater extent by outside forces than internally (National Research Council, 
2012), consistent with the fact that NASA’s funding derives externally. NASA programs and 
direction are influenced by its stakeholders: the public, congress, and the president. 
NASA is expected to accurately forecast, for projects that take years or decades to 
develop, how much cost it will occur in a specific year. Yet, the appropriation of funds by 
Congress occurs on an annual basis. Hence, there is a temporal incongruence between NASA’s 
program development and US Congress funding mechanisms. McCurdy argues that this 
“encourages bureaucrats to spend money they do not need or waste time waiting for 
appropriations they have not received” (McCurdy, 2001: 96) and may lead to “maintaining 
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people on the payroll without giving them the money to build something” (McCurdy, 2013). The 
annual budget-driven approach often results in NASA having to stretch project schedules to 
accommodate the changes and the re-planning that increases fixed and indirect costs (National 
Research Council, 2012). Further, the out-year budget projection provided to NASA has been 
characterized as unreliable, creating difficulties for program managers to plan on a multi-year 
basis (National Research Council, 2012).  
The ability to be adaptable is essential due to the tenure of the President of the United 
States being four years and the tenure of US Congress officials being two years (House of 
Representatives) or six years (Senate). Political (and thus financial) support of space endeavor 
might shift with a new President. A prime example of political uncertainty was exemplified by 
the cancellation of the Constellation program, initiated in 2004, by President Obama in 2011. The 
Constellation program was intended to support NASA’s capabilities for human space flight to 
return to the moon, and a future orientation towards reaching out to Mars. As part of the initial 
strategy, President Bush initiated the completion of the shuttle program and the seeding of a 
commercial space market to allow NASA to gain access to the International Space Station (ISS) 
on a commercial vehicle. Constellation also provided a replacement capability for the shuttle 
program to go to ISS and to grow that capability to explore beyond Earth. However, the funding 
required for full constellation execution was never provided (Augustine et al., 2009). Faced with 
a decision of increasing the budget to fund constellation fully or canceling the program and 
scoping a new program to fit within a constrained budget, President Obama cancelled the 
program. His budget increased funding for growing commercial industry to provide spaceflight to 
and from the ISS, and removed the NASA vehicle that had been planned to do so. However, 
Congress strongly advocated that NASA should develop its own competencies in crew 
transportation systems. In 2010, US Congress and President Obama agreed on a compromise that 
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over-stretched NASA’s resources: NASA was to develop a new space launch system, evidently 
replacing the cancelled Constellation program, and simultaneously fund and exploit the new 
commercial crew transportation market (National Research Council, 2012). 
The inefficiencies engendered by funding uncertainty and temporal incongruence 
compromise the pursuit of ambidexterity since operational priorities can change unexpectedly; 
this occurs directly through practices such as project stretching, and indirectly through the long-
term effects of uncertainty on the organization culture of NASA.  However, uncertainty can also 
heighten the need to be ambidextrous since ambidextrous organizations are also adaptable to 
change and able to function more effectively under conditions of uncertainty.  
External Critiques of NASA and Shifting Competitive Environment 
Reports of independent inquiries after both the Challenger and the Columbia disasters 
were critical of several organizational aspects of NASA, including its risk management and 
safety processes. More recent reports continue to be critical. The National Research Council 
(2012) report for example found that there is no national consensus on NASA’s strategic goals 
and objectives, without which NASA cannot be expected to have a clear long-term plan and 
implement it effectively. NASA’s strategic plan was described as vague, lacking prioritization 
and clarity, and its vision and mission statements were described as generic rather than unique. 
Secondly, the report contended that there is not sufficient integration across the different NASA 
field centers which compromises the accomplishment of agency-wide goals and objectives. 
Thirdly, that significant constraints imposed by legislation and regulation, such as rules regarding 
variations in workforce and uses of infrastructure impede NASA’s flexibility in accomplishing its 
goals. Fourth, that there is a significant mismatch between the programs NASA has set out to 
carry out, and the budget available.  
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Published in the same year, the Space Foundation (2012: 1) report noted that there are 
“frequent redirection and constantly shifting priorities at NASA, mixed signals from Congress 
and the administration, organizational conflicts, and the lack of a singular purpose, resulting in a 
space agency without a clear, stable direction”. The report made several strategic and tactical 
recommendations, including the development of a clear purpose for NASA, more stable funding 
and the appointment of NASA administrators with a fixed term of 5 years which would be 
unaffected by changes in presidency and “arbitrary changes in the direction of the agency” (2012: 
2) that a new administration can bring.   
Meanwhile, both the private sector and other nations have been investing in and 
developing space technologies, challenging NASA’s historical dominance of and leadership in 
space exploration. Private space companies such as Space X and Blue Origin, even though they 
often license NASA technology, compete for NASA contracts and employ NASA scientists, can 
also undertake certain tasks (such as transporting cargo to the International Space Station) more 
efficiently than NASA and have commendable innovation goals. Hyper-ambitious and well-
funded national space agencies such as China National Space Administration mean that NASA 
has real competition on space-faring competence. According to the Space Foundation (2014), 
global spending on space-related activities was US$314bn, and with NASA’s budget of 
US$18bn, it accounted for 5.7% of this spending. 
NASA has more recently started experimenting with open innovation, posing innovation 
challenges online in open competitions, as a complement to internal innovation efforts. The 
possibility for task decomposition and the wide problem-solving capabilities (Lakhani, Lifshitz-
Assaf & Tushman, 2013) make this a potentially effective exploration approach, at lower cost. 
However open innovation can address only a particular part of NASA’s total technological and 
operational challenges, making it a useful but not sufficient approach to innovation.  
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DISCUSSION 
The Historical and Contextual Embeddedness of Organizational Ambidexterity 
Viewing an organization in a historical - contextual manner highlights how its 
experiences and the way particular organizational features develop can have complex, systemic 
effects on its propensity to accomplish ambidexterity, in a way that results in unique 
organizational configurations. In particular, our analysis of NASA’s historical trajectory has 
pointed towards a number of key themes that cohered in terms of two broad categories; 
organizational features and the role of the external environment, both of which shape NASA’s 
ongoing propensity to accomplish ambidexterity.   
   ----------------------------------------------------------- 
     Figure 2 about here 
   ----------------------------------------------------------- 
The causality of the factors identified in Figure 2 with respect to organizational 
ambidexterity however is hard to discern and could at times be dual, both supporting and 
impeding ambidexterity. Structural separation at NASA for example has had both positive and 
negative effects. The separation of exploitative and exploratory units aided ambidexterity in the 
sense that it enabled the organization to innovate (explore) as well as implement (exploit) 
effectively, by focusing each Center on its area of competence. The decentralization and low 
cross-unit integration however led to duplication of activities and compromised efficiency. Table 
2 below offers an outline of key themes, their effects on propensity to be ambidextrous, and the 
organizational rationale for this evaluation.  
   ----------------------------------------------------------- 
     Table 2 about here 
   ----------------------------------------------------------- 
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 Table 2 shows that a variety of environmental and organizational factors can have 
plural and often unexpected effects on an organization’s propensity to be ambidextrous. Contrary 
to broad prescriptions for accomplishing ambidexterity, our findings point towards a particularist 
perspective on ambidexterity as a historically and contextually embedded process.  
This finding can shed light on why in ambidextrous organizations it may be challenging 
to characterize their implementation modes along any of the dominant prescriptions of 
ambidexterity. Adler, Goldoftas and Levine’s (1999) study of Toyota revealed for example that 
the manufacturing operations of the company can accomplish both efficiency as well as 
flexibility via four processes: metaroutines, enrichment, switching, and partitioning. However, it 
is difficult to juxtapose these organizational practices with the dominant ambidexterity 
prescriptions. It is worth noting that Toyota’s lean manufacturing system has as yet not been 
successfully imitated by other auto-makers, and the unique Japanese heritage of Toyota is a 
significant part of the explanation of why this is so.   
Ambidexterity as a Path-Dependent Process 
Our case analysis shows how propensity to be ambidextrous is shaped by prior 
organizational trajectories and external conditions. Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch (2009) view 
path dependence as a pattern of actions that arises from the “unintended consequences of former 
decisions and positive feedback processes” (p. 696), ultimately leading to lock-in that is hard to 
escape from. Combined with organizational decentralization and relatively low levels of cross-
center integration, NASA’s formative period set the scene for substantial path-dependent 
constraints on accomplishing ambidexterity, in a process that has been referred to as “imprinting” 
(Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). Imprinting is defined as “a process whereby, during a brief period of 
susceptibility, a focal entity develops characteristics that reflect prominent features of the 
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environment, and these characteristics continue to persist despite significant environmental 
changes in subsequent periods” (p. 201).  
NASA was created to fulfill geopolitical goals with ample funding from the state, so that 
it could single-mindedly pursue the moon-landing goal posed by President Kennedy, within a 
clearly defined timeframe. Reliability and safety were key features of the organizational culture, 
and cost consciousness was not top of the agenda. Since organization culture is shaped by early 
experiences, successes and challenges of a group (Schein, 1990), NASA continued its path, till 
the present, with a hardwired norm that efficiency was not key.      
Subsequent efforts such as the FBC (Faster, Better, Cheaper) approach aimed to 
accomplish exploration with as low cost as possible, presenting a direct challenge to the 
organization culture. This approach was prompted by tighter funding and the gradual injection of 
market discipline via private sector competition and competition from other nation states, that 
have acted as prompts to balance exploration and exploitation more effectively. FBC was an 
unprecedented experience for the organization that was met with mixed results, as the approach 
proved unsuitable for projects of high complexity.  
Our study shows that context and history matter to the accomplishment of ambidexterity 
because they create particular trajectories of path dependence for organizations. Path dependence 
as the “tendency for organizations to take decisions based on, and have their present state defined 
by, their history” (Hall, 2003: 240) has potent effects as can be seen for example in terms of 
inertia to change at NASA over the years, which impeded organizational change even after 
substantial shocks delivered by the tragic accidents in its history (Donahue & Leary, 2012). 
Figure 3 below outlines our findings in terms of the path-dependent nature of organizational 
ambidexterity.  
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----------------------------------------------------------- 
     Figure 3 about here 
   ----------------------------------------------------------- 
Our analysis therefore shows that pursuing ambidexterity is not just a matter of initiating 
organizational change along the lines of dominant prescriptions. Rather, it is a complex endeavor 
that must take into account how current organizational configurations have evolved over long 
periods in response to environmental features, stakeholder demands and task requirements.  
Organizational Ambidexterity in Public Sector Organizations 
The public administration literature has flirted with the concept of ambidexterity but has 
not as yet engaged substantively with it. The term was used as early as 1956, when Lappegaard, 
discussing the tensions between staff and line noted that certain principles could be used both to 
promote or castigate a course of action: “it’s amazing how ambidextrous a principle can be 
sometimes … they can be used both for offense and for defense, and correctly too” (Lappegaard, 
1956: 183). Brown-John (1976: 153) then referred to government agencies with both judicial and 
administrative powers as ambidextrous.  
Kelman, Sanders and Pandit (2015) suggested that senior government executives need to 
be ambidextrous in terms of being able to switch between different decision models depending on 
the type of decision to be made. Fossestol et al. (2015) noted that public sector organizations 
need to be ambidextrous when dealing with contradictory demands such as a new public 
management logic simultaneously with a traditional service provision logic (see also Reay & 
Hinings, 2009). Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2015) argued that different types of ambidexterity 
(structural and processual) would be useful in dealing with the tensions engendered in large, 
multi-level cross-sector collaborations. In this literature however, the concept was at best 
incidental to the main focus of the research. It is safe to say that so far the concept of 
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organizational ambidexterity has not been used in the public administration literature in any 
substantive way.  
However, our study implies that importing the dominant prescriptions of ambidexterity to 
the public sector may be ill-advised. Temporal ambidexterity for example would be unsuitable 
for NASA, since this avenue requires long periods of exploitation punctuated with short periods 
of exploration (or long periods of evolution punctuated by shorter periods of revolution). Rather, 
field centers have to continually explore, and ideally do so efficiently, within an exploitative 
mindset. Further, a punctuated equilibrium (temporal ambidexterity) approach involving 
transformational change has historically not been part of NASA’s DNA, given the cultural 
emphasis on reliability and safety, which requires conservatism and adhering to procedure. With 
respect to ecological ambidexterity, the rise of competition in the space-faring industry 
necessitates the development of inter-organizational networks and partnerships (Stadler et al., 
2014) that can offer technology and capabilities towards supporting both exploration and 
exploitation (Kauppila, 2010) to achieve stretching goals more efficiently. However NASA’s 
public-sector oriented organization culture may not be fully conducive to such collaborations.  
Whereas broad ambidexterity prescriptions seem clear enough, their implementation in 
particular settings such as the public sector is fraught with complexity. Our findings are 
particularly relevant to public sector organizations, that are caught in a double bind. On the one 
hand, the logic of the market and business ideology (Reay & Hinings, 2009) are supplementing a 
service logic (Fosstestol et al., 2015) and influencing governments’ thinking about the funding of 
public sector organizations. Public-private partnerships often surface such tensions (Bryson et al., 
2015). On the other hand, public sector organizations are constrained by regulations, history and 
culture on the means they can employ to become more efficient while offering high quality 
services, or in ambidexterity terms, balance the simultaneous pressures for exploration and 
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exploitation.  Extending the use of the ambidexterity concept in the public administration 
literature would be useful in terms of shedding light on how the tensions invoked by the 
simultaneous existence of different, often conflicting logics can be handled by public sector 
organizations.  
Practice Implications 
Public sector organizations face added complexity in the pursuit of ambidexterity, since 
some of the levers habitually available in the private sector may not be feasible to employ in the 
public sector. A key implication for practice is that the implementation of initiatives towards 
ambidexterity has to be sensitive to the organization’s prior path and the task it has to 
accomplish. This involves a delicate balancing act; a type of ambidextrous leadership (Tushman, 
Smith & Binns, 2011). On the one hand there is a need to have deep knowledge and appreciation 
of context and history and their effects, but at the same time also being mindful of the risks of 
“going native”, taking for granted the current organizational arrangements and therefore not 
challenging them.   
Further, leaders can be aware of the dual nature of crises that can act as opportunities, and 
to be ready to capitalize on those opportunities. For example, in NASA’s case, tighter funding 
and intensifying external competition, both by states and by the private sector, has been 
challenging for a public sector organization that has traditionally been a global leader in its 
sector. Such conditions however have also spurred re-thinking of how to compete, and fostered 
initiatives such as open innovation (Lakhani et al., 2013) and collaborations with industry, that 
that can over time be beneficial for the journey towards organizational ambidexterity.  A further 
implication for leaders concerns persistence, patience and focus. In every case where 
organizational ambidexterity is accomplished (e.g. Heracleous, 2013; O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2004), it is the result of a multi-year journey with ongoing challenges. Even in these cases, 
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ambidexterity is a capability that has to be continuously supported and negotiated, and may 
decline if neglected.  
Limitations and future research 
We have based our study on a single, in-depth qualitative case study. As is appropriate to 
such studies, we aim for generalization to theory rather than statistical generalization (Yin, 2008). 
Our research question was how history and context could shape an organization’s propensity to 
become ambidextrous, and the insights gained in this respect, and presented in with reference to 
NASA (Figure 2 and Table 2), as well as in a more generalizable format (Figure 3) can inform 
research in a number of other organizations. We acknowledge the limitations however that stem 
from research in a single case study. It would be beneficial to carry out multiple-case research 
and investigate whether our findings hold across cases.  
A further limitation stems from the use of published data. It would have been useful to be 
able to utilize primary data based on interviews and observation. This would have allowed more 
extensive data triangulation as well as enrichment of certain themes. However, utilizing such data 
did not prove possible in this instance. It would be useful for further research to utilize first-hand 
accounts and triangulate them with published information.  
Finally, we carried out this study from the perspective of pluralist organization theory 
rather than alternative perspectives such as systems theory or critical theory. No doubt alternative 
perspectives would uncover themes that we did not emphasize in this study. Further research 
could therefore investigate how public sector organizations deal with conflicting logics and 
tensions from a variety of perspectives so that a more rounded understanding can emerge.    
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Figure 1 
Initial Narrative Themes, Second Order Themes and Aggregate Categories 
 
 
  
• NASA‘s culture transferred from predecessor organizations
• Each NASA centre developed its own culture due to task 
division, and growth in a decentralized and autonomous fashion
• Early focus on NASA‘s technical capability through in-house 
technical knowledge, hands-on work and recruitment of 
exceptional employees
• Over time aging employee base and low turnover
• Growing oversight and contracting out lead to higher focus on 
compliance and following procedures
• Technical accountability challenged by bureaucratic 
accountability
• Priorities and tasks influenced to different degrees by external 
stakeholders, leading to goal uncertainty
• Temporal incongruence between US Congress appropriating 
funds annually vs long project horizons creates uncertainty
• Initial ample funding and emphasis on reliability and technical 
excellence downplay cultural focus on cost control
• Continuous funding reductions after Apollo necesstate cost 
cutting
• NASA has to comply with multiple regulations including areas of 
human resources, infrastructure management and contracting
• Regulatory oversight reduces NASA’s organizational flexibility
Organization culture
Personnel characteristics
Growth of bureaucracy
Stakeholders and goal 
uncertainty
Pressures for efficiency
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inflexibility
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Role of external 
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Figure 2 
Environmental and Organizational Factors Shaping Ambidexterity at NASA 
 
                        
Ambidexterity	effects
Organizational	antecedents
• Decentralized	fiefdoms,	 high	
unit		autonomy	and	low	
internal	integration
• Cultural	emphasis	 on	
reliability	and	technical	
excellence	vs	cost	control
• Low	workforce	turnover,	
ageing	demographics
• Burgeoning	administrative	
resource	over	time,	inertia,	
conservatism
Environmental	factors
• Growing	legislative	and	
regulatory	constraints
• Shifting	state	priorities,	 goal	
uncertainty
• Temporal	incongruence	
between	funding	 cycles	and	
NASA’s	 project	horizons
Environmental	factors
Performance	outcomes
• Critical	evaluations	of	
NASA	performance
• Focus	on	extent	of	
variance	from	budget
• Complex	missions	
delivered	successfully
• Ambiguous	 or	critical	
stakeholder	stance
• Gradual	tightening	of	
government	funding
• Competition	 from	private	
sector	and	other	nations
• Higher	institutionalized	
emphasis	 on	exploration	than	
on	exploitation
• Low	sense	 of	urgency,	
bureaucratic	inertia
• Unclear	performance	criteria
• Efforts	to	achieve	more	with	
less	and	to	engage	networks
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Figure 3 
Path Dependence and Organizational Ambidexterity 
 
 
 
  
Propensity	 to	
balance	exploration	
and	exploitation
History	and	Context Organizational	Features
• Formative	events
• Key	stakeholder	priorities
• Resource	dependence
• Regulatory	environment
• Competitive	 pressures
• Value	system
• Organization	design	 (e.g.	
structural	integration)
• Organizational	processes	
(e.g.	human	resources)	
• Adaptability	vs	inertia
shape shape
Ambidexterity
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Table 1 
Second Order Themes and Representative Quotes 
 
 
  
Second order	
themes
Representative quotes
Cultural	
foundations
Much	of	NASA's	 early	culture	existed	before	NASA	was	created,	in	the	predecessor	organizations	that	came	together	to	form	the civilian	
space	program	…	Many	agencies	incorporate	conflicting	cultures.	This often	results	from	the	practice	of	amalgamating	separate	
institutions,	each	with	its	own	distinct	culture,	into	governmental	conglomerates.	Institutions	so	created	tend	to	be	confederations	of	
cultures	rather	than	one	culture	fit	to	a	common	mold.	NASA	fits	this	description particularly	well	(McCurdy,	1993:	6-7)
NASA	also	established	other centers	around	the	country	devoted	to	specific	purposes,	some	of	them	in	support	of	the	other	centers	…	
The	assembly	of	existing	organizations	produced	a	confederation	of	cultures	(Tomkins,	2005:	56)
Currently,	NASA’s	complex	of	centers	operate	quasi-independently	rather	than	as	an	integrated	capability.	This	has	led	to	competition	
between	centers,	duplicative	and	sub-critical	development	efforts,	and	program	assignments	that	are	best	described	as	counter-intuitive	
(such	as	experimental	and	development	work	at	centers	with	no	expertise	in	those	areas) (National	Research	Council,	2012:	48)
From	the	perspective	of	organizational	evolution, there	has	never	been	a	single,	cohesive	NASA	culture	…	The	fact	that	all	but	a	handful	
of	NASA	centers	were	taken	over	from	other	organizations	fuels	the	divergence	of	center	cultures	from	each	other	and	from	
headquarters	(Space	Foundation,	2012:	17)
Personnel
characteristics
Much	of	the	insistence	on	in-house	work	and	contractor	oversight	was	based	on	the	pride	that	the	NACA	and	ABMA	employees	had	in	
their	own	capabilities…	Another	way	that	NASA	officials	maintained	the	agency’s	technical	capability	was	by	offering	their	employees	the	
opportunity	to	do	hands-on	work	(McCurdy,	1993:	41-42)
the	original	technical	cultureof	NASA	assumed	the	need	to	recruit	and	keep	the	best	and	brightest	from	U.S.	colleges	and	universities.	...	
Personal	experience	confirmed	this	element	for	me;	the	NASA	employees	of	the	original	technical	culture	were	indeed	exceptional	
(Tompkins,	2005:	61)
The	lay-offs	 had	a	devastating effect	on	agency	morale.	With	the	flow	of	new	blood	constricted,	NASA	began	to	show	signs	of	age.	The	
work	force	grew	older.	The	number	of	young	people	entering	the	work	force	declined.	Engineers	and	scientists,	the	core	professional	
group	within	NASA,	advanced	in	years	(McCurdy,	1993:	104)
The	distribution	of	work	among	NASA	centers	in	recent	years	 has	favored	the	sustainment	of	all	the	centers	…	over	establishing	and	
maintaining	centers	of	excellence ... This	has	in	part	resulted	from	…	the	legal	prohibition	on	NASA	from	applying	regular	reduction-in-
force	(RIF)	governmental	policies	to	its	civil	servants.	As	a	result,	some	civil	service	staff	are	retained	even	when	they	are	no	longer	
needed	at	their	assigned	center (National	Research	Council,	2012:	47)
Bureaucracy NASA’s	organizational culture	reached	its	apex	during	the	preparation	for	the	Apollo	flights	to	the	moon.	Technical	discretion	and	
organizational	skill	balanced	each	other.	That	balance	proved	to	be	ephemeral.	As	NASA	matured,	the	technical	culture	grew	weaker.	So	
did	the	centralizing	forces	brought	in	to	manage	Project	Apollo.	In	their	place	a	more	conventional	form	of	government	organization	
arose.	NASA	grew	bureaucratic	(McCurdy,	1993:	98)
NASA’s	expanded	use	of	contractors	resulted	in	additional	administrative structures	and	procedures	to	coordinate	and	control	NASA-
contractor	relations.	During	this	same	period,	all	aspects	of	government	were	contending	with	increased	oversight	…	professional	
accountability	struggled	to	survive	as	the	agency	adopted	the	trappings	of	bureaucratic	accountability	(Vaughan,	1996:	211)
Over time	NASA	has	evolved	into	a	very	large	government	bureaucracy	with	a	vast	range	of	employees,	labs,	centers	and	specialized	
facilities,	along	with	a	host	of	high-technology	corporations	that	live	off	NASA	contracts	(Pelton,	2006:	222)
Bureaucracies usually	try	to	mitigate	risk	by	adding	procedures	and	regulations	to	existing	practices	…	Many	NASA	activities	end	up	being	
planned	almost	as	rigorously	as	human	spaceflight.	This	introduces	rigidity,	increased	transaction	costs,	and	inefficiences	in	areas	where	
a	purely	technical	approach	to	risk	management	is	not	appropriate	(Space	Foundation,	2012:	21)
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Table 1 (continued) 
Second Order Themes and Representative Quotes 
 
  
Second order	
themes
Representative quotes
Stakeholders
and	goal	
uncertainty
These	 power	relationships	between	NASA	and	its	external	stakeholders	– the	government,	private	contractors, and	space	station	
partners	– created	an	environment	of	problems	where	NASA,	the	focal	organization,	is	dependent	on	resources	on	members	of	its	
external	coalition	with	little	or	no	recourse	to	limit	that	dependence	(Garner,	2006:	379)
Organizationally,	NASA	has	been	shaped	by	external	forces	driven	by	symbolic	needs	rather	than	technology,	and	the	result	has been	an	
identity	crisis	for	NASA	as	a	technology-based	agency.	The	fact	that	the	agency	has	been	constantly	trying	to	respond	to	this	dichotomy	
since	the	end	of	the	Apollo	era	further	exacerbates	the	problem,	and	has	direct	implications	for	NASA’s	future (Johnson-Freese &	
Handberg,	1991:	434)
NASA’s	challenges	are	evident	in	budgetary	politics between	the	branches	and	within	Congress.	With	the	exception	of	just	three	years	
since	the	agency	was	created	…	inflation-adjusted	congressional	appropriations	for	NASA	have	fallen	below	presidents’	requests	...	The	
divergence	between	NASA’s	long-term	programmatic	commitments	and	appropriations	cuts	could	not	be	more	evident	for	the	success	or	
failure	of	the	agency’s	programs.	The	result	has	been	to	jeopardize	NASA’s	ability	to	engage	in	strategic,	long-term	planning	for	the	
implementation	of	human	spaceflight	and	other	large-scale	programs	(Conley	&	Cobb,	2012:	52)
As	the	space	program	has	evolved,	we	have	witnessed	frequent	redirection	and	constantly	shifting	priorities	at	NASA,	mixed	signals	from	
Congress	and	the	administration,	organizational	conflicts,	and	the	lack	of	a	singular	purpose,	resulting	in	a	space	agency	without	a	clear,	
stable	direction (Space	Foundation,	2012:	1)
Pressures	for	
efficiency
At	the	height	of	Cold	War	competition, ballooning	cost	and	size	did	not	seem	to	matter.	NASA	and	Air	Force	executives	adopted	cultures	
of	competence	that	put	project	performance	well	above	concerns	over	cost	and	size.	When	the	easy	money	days	disappeared,	aerospace	
executives	found	themselves	with	an	intractable	problem	(McCurdy,	2001:	88)
The	aftermath	of	John	F.	Kennedy’s	historic	‘‘man	on	the	Moon’’	speech	in	1961	sparked	the	‘‘space	race’’	between	the	United	States	
and	the	Soviet	Union	as	each	struggled	to	prove	its	technological	superiority.	Cost	concerns	were	of	less	importance	during	this era	as	
nothing	could	be	spared	to	beat	the	Soviets	to	the	Moon.	However,	at	the	end	of	the	era,	NASA	 experienced	substantial	budget	cuts	
(Hall,	2003:	240)	
The	Commission	is	convinced that	NASA’s	business	culture	must	be	changed	to	embrace	a	significantly	different	role	for	itself	in	our	
space	exploration	enterprise.	NASA	needs	a	much-improved	capability	both	to	learn	from	and	partner	with	a	more	robust	space	industry.	
The	new	NASA	will	be	frugal	and	more	nimble	…	The	Commission	believes	that	NASA	needs	to	transform	itself	into	a	leaner,	more	
focused	agency	 (President’s	Commission,	2004:	21)
Despite	its	significant accomplishments,	NASA’s	funding	has	fallen	to	historically	low	levels	(adjusted	for	inflation)	…	squeezing	the	
agency’s	ability	to	develop	new	missions	for	human	exploration,	astronomy,	planetary	science,	Earth	science,	solar	science,	technology	
development,	and	aeronautics	research,	which	has	led	to	cost	and	schedule	inefficiencies	for	ongoing	programs	and	missions	(Space	
Foundation,	2016:	2)
Increased
regulations,
inflexibility
Since	1965	…	the	federal	government has	adopted	60	new	public	laws,	25	Executive	Orders,	16	OMB	circulars,	and	24	Office	of	Federal	
Procurement	Policy	letters	dealing	with	just	contracting	policy.	Joined	with	civil	service	regulations	and	legislative	oversight,	these	
developments	have	enlarged	NASA’s	bureaucratic	burden	and	reduced	the	flexibility	needed	to	manage	the	technically	difficult	space	
program	(McCurdy,	1992:	191)
The	procurement regulations	under	which	NASA	was	obliged	to	operate	grew	more	complicated	…	The	federal	civil	service	agency	
restricted	NASA’s	use	of	excepted	and	nonquota	positions	to	attract	top-rate	professionals	with	higher	pay	...	Other	federal	regulations	
swelled:	accounting	standards,	affirmative	action,	requirements	for	peer	review,	occupational	health	and	safety,	environmental	
protection	...	Individually,	each	change	had	a	worthy	objective	that	led	to	its	enactment.	Together,	the	changes	produced	an	appalling	
growth	of	bureaucracy	(McCurdy,	1993:	110-11).	
Rules	and	regulations	have,	over	the	years,	served	as	sort	of	mechanism	for	the	preservation	of	institutional	knowledge	and	various
lessons	learned,	but	without	the	formal	review,	challenge,	and	discussion	mechanisms	embedded within	the	standards	process.	The	
result	is that	many	of	these	regulations	have	become an	overconstrainingmass	of	procedures	and	checklists	(Space Foundation,	2012:	
61)
Legislative	and	regulatory	limitations	on	NASA’s	freedom	to	manage	its	workforce	and	infrastructure	constrain	the	flexibility that	a	large	
organization	needs	to	grow	or	shrink	specific	scientific,	engineering,	and	technical	areas	in	response	to	evolving	goals	and	budget	realities
(National	Research	Council,	2012:	49)
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Table 2 
Environmental and Organizational Factors, Effect on Ambidexterity and Organizational Rationale at NASA 
 
Environmental	and	
organizational	 factors
Effect on	
ambidexterity
Organizational rationale
Decentralized	fiefdoms, high	
unit	autonomy	and	low	internal	
integration
Both Negative	
and Positive
Low	integration	across	units	and	duplication	of	activities	increased	costs.		Common	values	
and	precipitating	event	of	putting	a	man	on	 the	moon	however	brought	units	together.	
Separation	of	exploratory	and	exploitative	units	aided	ambidexterity.	
Cultural	emphasis on	reliability	
and	technical	excellence,	vs
cost	control
Negative Exploration	is	emphasized in	the	development of technology	characterizedby reliability
and	technical	excellence;	downplaying	attention	to	cost	control	and	efficiency	in	the	
process
Low	workforce turnover,	ageing	
demographics
Negative It	is	challenging	for older	employees	to	be	adaptable,	due	to	the	conservative	nature	of	
cognitive	maps,	shared	norms,	organizational	routines	and	established	practices
Burgeoning administrative	
resource	over	 time,	inertia,	
conservatism
Negative Ambidexterity is	facilitated	by	structures	with	low	bureaucratic	costs,	and	cultures	that	
embrace	both	poles	of	exploration	and	exploitation;	excessive	administrative	procedures	
foster	inertia	and	conservatism	that	are	not	conducive	 to	either	pole
Growing	legislative	and	
regulatory	constraints	reduce	
adaptability
Negative Higher	legislative and	regulatory	constraints	lead	to	higher	level	of	internal	resources	
focused	on	compliance	and	conservatism,	leading	to	inertia,	rather	than	enabling	both	
poles	of	ambidexterity
Shifting	state	priorities,	goal
uncertainty
Negative Shifts	in	priorities	of	key	stakeholders that	impact	org	goals	means	that	the	sunk	costs	of	
existing	projects may	not	be	optimized,	impacting	both	exploration	and	exploitation
Temporal	incongruence
between	funding	cycles	and	
NASA’s	project	horizons	
Negative	to	
Neutral
Long	project horizons	combined	with	funding	uncertainty	can	lead	to	sub-optimal	return	
on	investment	since	funding	may	not	be	aligned	with	project	needs.	But	it	can	also	foster	
commitment	to	doing	things	efficiently	and	adaptably	to	reduce	these	risks
Ambiguous	or	critical	
stakeholder	stance
Neutral	to	
Positive
Critical	stakeholder stance	can	impact	funding	but	may	also	increase	commitment	to	
become	ambidextrous,	so	that	stakeholder	stance	becomes	more	positive	in	future	
Gradual	tightening	of	
government	funding
Positive Pressure	on	resources increases	motivation	to	explore	new	ways	of	doing	things	more	
efficiently	and	adaptably,	fostering	process	innovations	and		a	culture	of	ambidexterity
Competition	from	private	
sector	and	other	nations
Positive Market	pressure	and	discipline via	competition	helps	to	provide	performance	
benchmarks,	and	sense	of	urgency,	and	can	raise	commitment	towards	competitiveness
